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CONSENT TO UNJUST
INSTITUTIONS
Bas van der Vossen
Chapman University, Orange, California, United
States
Abstract
John Rawls wrote that people can voluntarily acquire political obligations to institutions only on the condition that those institutions are at least reasonably just.
When an institution is seriously unjust, by contrast, attempts to create political obligation are “void ab initio.” However, Rawls’s own explanation for this thought was
deeply problematic, as are the standard alternatives. In this paper, I offer an argument
for why Rawls’s intuition was right and trace its implications for theories of authority
and political obligation. These, I claim, are more radical than is often thought.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls writes: “it is not possible to have an obligation to autocratic and arbitrary forms of government.” In his view, it’s not
possible to bind oneself to obey such institutions. Unless institutions are
reasonably just, attempts to incur political obligations are “void ab initio.”
Try as we might, we cannot legitimize unjust governments through consent.
If Rawls is right, it would follow that, at least insofar as the consent theory
of legitimate authority is concerned, justice limits legitimacy. The demands
of justice circumscribe what a theory like consent theory can establish.
If indeed “it is not possible to be bound to unjust institutions,”1 there are
distinct limits to the roles legitimate institutions can play.
Rawls’s theory did not ground legitimate authority in the consent of subjects.2 Nevertheless, his observation is important. Not only is it important to
1. The quotes are from JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknapp Press rev. ed. 1999), at 96.
The context here is Rawls’s discussion of the principle of fairness. To Rawls, consent and promises are special cases of the principle of fairness. Id. at 303.
2. Nor did Rawls think legitimacy circumscribed by justice in the way (I argue) consent
theory implies. As I understand it, the position Rawls developed (especially in his later
work) holds that laws are binding if passed in accordance with a legitimate constitution,
where a legitimate constitution is based on an appropriately acceptable political conception
of justice. In this theory, public reason might operate as an analogue to consent, but remains
importantly different. Thus, laws might be considered unjust yet legitimate or binding to Rawls
as long as the institution (or constitution) is not so unjust as to become illegitimate in light of
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know what obligations we may be under when we face unjust governments,
it’s also important to know what kinds of obligations we can create in such
contexts. Consent remains a straightforward and plausible way (perhaps the
most straightforward and plausible way) in which people can obligate themselves. And the consent theory of political obligation gives clear expression
to the idea that the legitimate authority of a state or government is conferred upon it by its subjects. Through their consent, subjects give or transfer to institutions the right to rule. This is another reason to investigate
Rawls’s thought: what’s true of consent theory may well be true of other theories that see authority as given to institutions by subjects.
I.
Consider three possible explanations for Rawls’s thought that consent cannot legitimize unjust institutions.3 The ﬁrst, suggested by Rawls himself,
holds that it’s impossible to bind oneself to unjust institutions because
these are excluded from the set of things toward which one can voluntarily
incur obligations. Call this the Exclusion Thesis.
Exclusion Thesis: It’s impossible to voluntarily incur obligations to unjust
institutions.

Others demur. For example, A. John Simmons suggests that the Exclusion
Thesis is false. People can incur obligations of obedience to unjust institutions,
he argues, just like they can incur obligations to unjust people; however, these
obligations must be balanced against other moral considerations. Rawls’s
thought is then explained by the obligation to obey being outweighed on
balance by the institution’s injustice. Call this the Balancing Thesis.
Balancing Thesis: It’s possible to incur obligations to unjust institutions, but
these must be balanced against other moral considerations.

A third explanation holds that we can successfully consent to obey unjust
institutions (contrary to the Exclusion Thesis), but that there are moral limits to the obligations consent can generate. Because of these limits, whatever
one becomes obligated to obey does not include unjust laws (contrary to
the Balancing Thesis). Call this the Limitation Thesis.
Limitation Thesis: Incurring obligations to unjust institutions is possible, but
there are moral limits to what such obligations can require.
the relevant political conception of justice. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia
University Press expanded ed. 2005), at 137, 428.
3. For ease, I use the terms “legitimacy” and “legitimate authority” interchangeably. I don’t
deny that these terms can be used in ways that are not equivalent. Further, I assume that people
subject to legitimate authorities have political obligations, and that they can confer legitimate
authority upon institutions by incurring political obligations toward them.
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In what follows, I defend (a reﬁned version of) the Limitation Thesis:
consent-based obligations have a built-in justice limitation.
The Limitation Thesis has some startling implications. Its truth may alter
how we think about the duty to obey the law. In particular, if the Limitation
Thesis is true, it follows that, insofar as a state or government is authorized
through the consent of the people, its authority is circumscribed morally.
That is, just or unjust, no institution is entitled to obedience to all its
laws, including unjust ones, because it governs with our consent.
The logic of the Limitation Thesis does not just apply to consent theory,
but to all theories of legitimacy that understand a state’s right to rule as
something that’s transferred to it by its subjects. For such accounts, the
Limitation Thesis holds.
II.
Let’s take the three theses in turn. Consider ﬁrst the Exclusion Thesis.
Rawls’s argument for why consent to unjust institutions fails goes as follows:
It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio. But similarly,
unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence,
and consent to them does not bind.4

Rawls was surely right that unjust institutions constitute a kind of violence.
While all political institutions use force in some way or other, unjust institutions rely on force much more frequently, much more severely, and in ways
that negate people’s basic moral standing. The same is not true of just institutions. Just institutions can reasonably hope for more voluntary support.
Nevertheless, as an argument for the Exclusion Thesis, Rawls’s argument
fails. As Simmons points out, extorted promises fail not because of the
nature of the agent to whom they are made, but because only voluntary
promises have morally binding power. And extorted promises are not
made voluntarily.
Even if an institution’s injustice is akin to violence, consent to it need not
be involuntary. It’s perfectly possible for people to freely choose, out of
their own free will, to consent to such institutions. They might be part of
a group that’s not subject to the institution’s violence, say. Such consent
seems binding irrespective of the moral quality of the recipient. The
same seems true with promises made to unjust people. If I promise a villain
to meet him for lunch, I become obligated to show up.5
Of course, the truth of the Exclusion Thesis doesn’t depend on this
defense. And other defenses have been attempted. Chaim Gans agrees
4. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 302.
5. A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligations, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 274, 277
(1976).
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that “it is the institution’s unjustness, rather than the involuntary nature of the consent
to it that renders such obligations void ab initio.”6 But the reason, Gans argues,
is that political obligations to such institutions would grant them far too
unwieldy a control over our actions. This distinguishes unjust institutions
from unjust persons, rendering Simmons’s critique misguided.7 Writes Gans:
The duty to obey unjust institutions is . . . a duty to perform acts because the
institution to which the duty is owed demands their performance. In acknowledging
such a duty to a given institution, we grant it the moral power to assign us particular duties, without retaining any control of their creation or contents.
Thus, in failing to exclude unjust institutions from the scope of the general
duty to obey the law, we will be granting unjust institutions moral power
which they may abuse directly. Such a move seems far more drastic than
acknowledging the duty to keep promises to villains.8

Gans’s thought is that, since political obligations authorize institutions to
determine what people may do, we can only entrust institutions with that
power if it cannot be used in morally dangerous ways. Unjust institutions
cannot be trusted in this way and are therefore excluded from the set of
potential recipients of political authority.
The key assumption for this argument is that if a person P incurs a political obligation to some agent A, then A becomes able to tell P what to do in
a wide range of matters.9 For Gans’s argument to work, this range has to
include committing or supporting injustice. If the duty to obey were limited
to exclude such actions, the stated problem with political obligations to
unjust institutions could not arise.
Gans’s argument, in other words, presupposes that the Limitation Thesis
is false. According to Gans, such views “involve a confusion as to the very
concept of the duty to obey the law.”10 The thought is that justice-limits
are conceptually incompatible with political obligations. If institutions
have authority, it’s up to them what subjects may or may not do.
The idea that, as a conceptual matter, political obligations are
unbounded in this way has a long pedigree. Call it, following H.L.A.
Hart, the idea that political obligations are content-independent.11 The
6. See CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL DISOBEDIENCE (1992), at 98 (emphasis in original).
7. Strictly speaking, then, Gans defends a more limited Exclusion Thesis according to which
it’s impossible to incur political obligations to unjust institutions. The difference is immaterial
here.
8. GANS, supra note 6, at 98–99 (emphasis in original).
9. “In acknowledging [a duty to keep promises to villains], we are not granting the villains the
power to create the promises and determine their contents. In acknowledging the duty to obey
unjust institutions, we are doing just this.” Id. at 99.
10. Id. at 103.
11. See H.L.A. Hart, Legal Duty and Obligation and Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in
ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 127, 243 (1982). See also LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1988),
especially 226, 239.
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motivation behind the desideratum is that it explains why subjects to a legitimate authority might be obligated to do something “because it’s the law”
(not because of the law’s content).
As a conceptual point, Gans’s point is impotent. Whether or not people
have content-independent political obligations isn’t a conceptual matter.
It depends on the nature of the obligations they actually have. Perhaps, if
their obligations to obey the law are limited in ways that disqualify them
as content-independent, and all political obligations are contentindependent, then the obligations they actually have are not properly “political obligations.” But they would still be obligations to obey the law. By what
name we refer to this doesn’t matter much.12
Setting aside the conceptual point, a more signiﬁcant problem is that Gans
is mistaken to assert that content-independence implies the denial of the
Limitation Thesis. The binding force of obligations that are clearly contentindependent can (nevertheless) be conditional on a requirement’s moral
quality. What’s required for obligations to count as content-independent is
that their binding force is not due to their moral quality. But that leaves
open that moral quality might disqualify requirements as morally binding.13
Plainly, promises and acts of consent are content-limited in everyday
life.14 If I promise you to help you ﬁx your car, for example, there are generally understood limits to what I can become required to do. If you ask me
to hand you a wrench, I become obligated to do so. When you tell me to buy
an expensive new part, I can refuse without breaking my promise. Such limitations are often implicit, but clearly my consent did not include that kind
of help. Nevertheless, my obligations of consent are content-independent.
When you ask for the wrench, I become obligated to hand it over “because
I promised.”15
There is, then, no problem with consent-based obligations being
content-limited in general. And that includes the kind of obligations that
give others the power to tell us what to do. If that’s true, it’s unclear why
moral limitations would be a problem for consent-based political obligations in particular.
We can distinguish between two versions of content-independence, then.
On the ﬁrst, when a state has legitimate authority, it can make actions obligatory because they’re legally required, even if they were not already
12. For a rejection of content-independence as essential to political obligation, see George
Klosko, Are Political Obligations Content Independent?, 39 POL. THEORY 498, 504–507 (2011). The
arguments below do not imply this sweeping rejection.
13. Laura Valentini helpfully distinguishes between content-independence and
content-insensitivity. The former may be a property of political obligation, but only the latter
implies that one cannot look at the law’s content to assess whether one is obligated to obey.
See Laura Valentini, The Content-Independence of Political Obligation: What It Is and How to Test It,
24 LEGAL THEORY 135 (2018).
14. See W.D. ROSS, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939), at 98–99.
15. For a similar point, see CHRISTOPHER H. WELLMAN, RIGHTS FORFEITURE AND PUNISHMENT
(2017), at 160ff.
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required because of their content, and the scope of this power is limited by
justice. On the second, when a state has legitimate authority, it can make
actions obligatory because they’re legally required, even if they were not
already required because of their content, and this power is not limited
by justice. Afﬁrming the former version, the Limitation Thesis is consistent
with content-independence.
Gans’s argument for rejecting the Limitation Thesis is mistaken, then.
And the Exclusion Thesis itself remains problematic. It either implies, as
Simmons argued, that we cannot successfully make promises to unjust persons. And that remains plainly false. Or it must insist on some kind of distinction between obligations to unjust institutions and unjust persons, so
that obligations to the latter can be created while obligations to the former
cannot.
Gans claims we should accept such a distinction. The argument he offers
is that institutions have only instrumental moral value, whereas individuals
have intrinsic moral value. And this is said to imply that obligations to institutions, in contrast to obligations to persons, are possible only if those institutions are also instrumentally valuable.16
But this looks in the wrong place. The power of consent is primarily
grounded in facts about the consenting agent. And, as such, the nature
of this power will be sensitive primarily to facts about the agent, not the
recipient. The key question here is whether agents ought to be able to
bind themselves to such recipients (whether persons or institutions). And
just as we can have reason to want the power to consent to things that are
morally trivial, or even to things that are regrettable, we can also have reason to want the power to bind ourselves to recipients that lack intrinsic or
instrumental value. When I blow all of my family’s savings in a casino,
indulging in a vice with a company that makes money from vice, I am still
obligated to pay the bill.
We can successfully consent to institutions, as to persons, irrespective of
their moral quality, then. The Exclusion Thesis is false.
III.
Simmons proposes to replace the Exclusion Thesis with the Balancing
Thesis:
[S]urely we ought not to support unjust institutions. But it seems more natural
to allow that we can sometimes succeed in obligating ourselves both by promises to villains and by consent to “autocratic and arbitrary forms of government” (to borrow Rawls’s phrase). In addition, however, we have a clear
16. See GANS, supra note 6, at 99–100. This is a puzzling argument since even very unjust institutions can presumably do instrumentally valuable things. Thus, the Exclusion Thesis (“[I]t is
the general duty to obey this system that is void, not only its individual applications.” Id. at 108)
itself seems instrumentally unjustiﬁed.
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duty both to help confound villainy and to ﬁght injustice. Thus, it will be a
matter for decision in individual cases whether, e.g., the harm done by
supporting an unjust institution and our duty to ﬁght injustice outweigh
any obligation we may have to respect its authority (deriving from our consent
to it).17

In Simmons’s view, consent is always a reason for obedience, irrespective of
the institution’s moral quality. And injustice is always a reason for disobedience. Whether one ought to obey laws, all things considered, depends on
the relative weight of these considerations.
The Balancing Thesis seems initially plausible. Many think that moral
considerations can clash, and that the right thing to do overall depends
on their relative weight. Nevertheless, in terms of capturing Rawls’s thought
that consent to unjust institutions is void ab initio, the thesis does not perform well. On Simmons’s view, such consent is not void, but outweighed.
Of course, some may ﬁnd this attractive, for example because they think
obedience can be required when the injustice isn’t very serious. In those
cases, the obligation from consent may win the day. However, this implication is difﬁcult to contain. For the Balancing Thesis can also imply an obligation to obey in cases of more serious or weighty injustices. In particular, it
can do so when injustices that are small at the individual level aggregate to
large injustices overall. Suppose a government institutes a $1 per capita tax
to line the president’s pockets. This is an injustice, to be sure, but it will not
be very weighty for any particular subject. After all, each of the taxed persons is harmed very little. It seems, then, that each of them (assuming
they consented) is obligated to pay the tax. Yet the result is an obligation
to support a very serious abuse of power.
One might object here that the Balancing Thesis can avoid this implication. After all, if minor abuses of power add up to something very serious
would that not outweigh the obligation to obey? But no subject is asked
to commit or support a serious injustice. They are asked only to perform
a very small, and not very harmful, wrong. The moral weight of this will
be accordingly small as well. If the obligation to obey the law is to be effective, it cannot be outweighed by things of such small weight.
Kent Greenawalt suggests a similar view, holding that promises to do
unjust things are morally binding.18 Greenawalt offers the example of promising to tell a white lie for a friend. Such a promise, he claims, is binding,
even though it’s wrong to tell lies. But this cannot be right. Suppose
Andy plans to rob a bank and promises to give Ben half the loot. After
the robbery, Andy takes off with all the money. Supporters of the
Balancing Thesis must say that Andy violated his obligation to Ben. After
17. Simmons, supra note 5, at 277–278. For the same view, see Zoﬁa Stemplowska & Adam
Swift, Dethroning Democratic Legitimacy, in OXFORD STUDIES IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 8 (David
Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall eds., 2018).
18. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY (1987), at 84–85.
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all, if Andy’s promise went through, he would have become morally obligated to give part of the money to Ben.
But this is just false. To see this, consider that successful promises create
rights in their recipients—rights correlative to the promissory obligation.
Thus, if Andy’s promise succeeded, Ben would have gained a right to the
money. But clearly, Ben has no claim to the money whatsoever—only
the money’s rightful owner does. If Andy wanted to do the right thing,
he need not think about whether Ben’s claim or the bank’s claim is
weightier. Ben has no claim, there’s no balancing to be done. Andy’s promise to give Ben the money was indeed void.
By contrast, if Ben really did have a claim, outweighed by the imperative
to return the money, there would be at least some pressure against returning
the money. After all, when rights are overridden, this represents something
regrettable, even if doing so is overall best. And, again, this is simply not the
case. There is no sense in which it’s regrettable if Andy returns the money.
Ben’s being promised a cut provides no pressure at all.
To see this, consider what Judith Jarvis Thomson has labeled the
“Aggravation Principle.” According to this principle: “If X has a claim
against Y that Y do alpha, then the worse Y makes things for X if Y fails to
do alpha, the more stringent X’s claim against Y that Y do alpha.”19
While formulated in a slightly different context, the principle can be
used to test whether a party has a claim. Imagine, then, that it would be
extremely bad for Ben to not receive the money. At some level of badness,
if the Balancing Thesis were true, the stringency of Ben’s claim should
become such as to override the rights of the bank (ﬂush with cash). But
this, again, clearly isn’t true. We don’t have to look into how Ben would
be affected to know that returning the money is the right thing to do.
Greenawalt might object, of course. Suppose it’s impossible for Andy to
return the money to the bank. Surely in that case, even if not in the one
above, Andy ought to give Ben the money? And if that’s true, doesn’t that
mean that Andy’s wrongful promise went through? But this again is mistaken.
As long as it’s possible for Andy to do something better with the money than
give it to Ben, it seems plain that Andy ought to do that. If Andy can’t return
the money, surely he ought to try and give it to the bank’s depositors. And
barring that, Andy should probably just give it to charity.20
Still, surely there is something wrong here? Doesn’t Ben have a complaint
against Andy? This strikes me as true, but this fact can be explained without
the Balancing Thesis. Perhaps Andy wronged Ben by ﬁrst creating and then
frustrating expectations. There is deﬁnite deception going on. And perhaps
there’s some other kind of unfairness involved.21 The point that matters for
19. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990), at 154.
20. Of course, if Andy cannot do anything better, the objection loses its force.
21. David Miller sees an element of desert: “there seems nothing incoherent or bizarre in
saying that the man who masterminded the bank robbery deserves a larger share of the loot
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now, however, is that whatever the nature of this wrong might be, it cannot
be the violation of an obligation to give Ben the money. The Balancing
Thesis is false.
IV.
The reason Ben didn’t get a right to the money is obvious, of course. The
money was never Andy’s to dispose of. And we can’t give away what we don’t
have. Since Andy lacked all right to the money, he cannot transfer to Ben
any claim to it. It’s not that easy for robbers to undercut the claims of rightful owners.
Call this thought the Limitation Principle.
Limitation Principle: One cannot transfer to others a right one doesn’t have
in the ﬁrst place.

The Limitation Principle applies to the consent theory of authority.
According to that theory, a government’s or institution’s authority is the
result of rights transferred to it by its subjects, via their consent. The transferred rights include the right to make certain decisions for subjects, decisions that subjects become obligated to follow as if they authored these
themselves.22 The Limitation Principle holds that when A consensually
transfers some right R to B, the set of rights B can acquire is no greater
than the set of rights A had in the ﬁrst place.
The Limitation Principle identiﬁes what we may call, using J.L. Austin’s
analysis of illocutionary acts, a “felicity condition.” Illocutionary acts like
consent must satisfy these conditions in order to be successful. When illocutionary acts violate felicity conditions, they “misﬁre.” Such misﬁres can
occur when illocutionary acts involve a misapplication of the correct procedure for their performance, for example. Or they can occur when the agent
performing the illocutionary act is not appropriate for the procedure. If I
try to consent on your behalf (without prior authorization), my act will
fail. Similarly, consent that is not freely given misﬁres as well.23
Misﬁres are distinctive because they represent cases in which an
attempted illocutionary act (here: consent) does not succeed. Austin contrasts misﬁres with other issues, like breaches, misunderstandings, or infractions. The difference, in his view, is that misﬁred illocutionary acts are, like
than the guy who merely drove the getaway car.” See DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1999), at 135.
22. As John Locke put it: “Men, when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Liberty,
and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the hands of the Society.” Similarly:
“Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one
his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick, there and there only is
a Political, or Civil Society.” See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1988) (1689), Second Treatise, sections 131 and 89, respectively.
23. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1975), at 34.
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Rawls said, void. The speaker attempts to apply a mechanism in circumstances where it does not apply. The result is, quite simply, nothing.24
Rawls’s comparison of consent to unjust institutions with coercion was
apt, then. When consent is coerced, it’s void because the correct application of the procedure requires the absence of duress. Only when consent
is offered voluntarily does the illocutionary act succeed. Coerced consent
is thus void ab initio. It does not signify the right-holder’s decision to transfer
rights.25
The Limitation Principle operates in the same manner. Only successful
acts of consent can transfer the rights necessary to authorize institutions.
But people generally lack the right to commit acts that are unjust. And
since the people lack this right, they cannot transfer it to institutions.
This is true no matter how qualiﬁed or unqualiﬁed their attempted consent.
One cannot transfer to an institution the right to command something one
lacks the right to do oneself in the ﬁrst place.26
The Limitation Principle focuses on cases of rights transfer. It’s true that
sometimes B can obtain a right R as a result of A’s actions, even though
A never had R in the ﬁrst place. Judges might award damages to plaintiffs,
the executor of a will might transfer possessions to beneﬁciaries, and so on.
The Limitation Principle does not deny that such powers exist. But these
are not cases where people are empowering others by transferring rights.
For those cases, where B gains R as a result of A’s transfer, the Limitation
Principle holds.
The Limitation Principle explains why Andy cannot give Ben a right to
the stolen money. Andy failed to confer such a right upon Ben because
Andy lacked a right to the money in the ﬁrst place. Since the consent theory
of authority uses the same framework, considering the powers of legitimate
government as the result of a consensual transfer by its subjects, the
Limitation Principle implies the same result.27 Since subjects lack the
right to commit or support injustice, they cannot bestow upon institutions
the right to require such things.
We can summarize this argument as follows:
(1) An institution has legitimate authority only if subjects have successfully given it the right that they obey the law through their consent.
(2) One cannot give to others a right one doesn’t have in the ﬁrst place.
24. Id. at 39.
25. For a similar analysis concerning consent given as a result of deception, see Tom
Dougherty, Sex, Lies and Consent, 123 ETHICS 717, 732–733 (2013). Dougherty claims that if A
consents to B as a result of B’s deceiving A, then A’s consent was invalid and thus void.
26. The Limitation Principle expresses a necessary condition for successful consent, not a
sufﬁcient one. It may be that one has rights that one cannot transfer to or use to authorize
others.
27. While it’s not clear if he would have accepted the Limitation Thesis defended here, John
Locke seems to endorse the logic of the Limitation Principle. See LOCKE, supra note 22, Second
Treatise, sections 135 and 168.
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(3) Therefore, a legitimate institution has a right that subjects do what
the law requires only if those subjects had a right to do those things
in the ﬁrst place.
(4) No one has the right to commit or support injustice.
(5) Therefore, a legitimate institution has a right that subjects do what
the law requires only if what the law requires is not unjust.
Premise 1 of this argument expresses the consent theory of legitimate
authority. Premise 2 is the Limitation Principle defended above. Premise
4 states the truism that injustices are impermissible. The argument’s conclusion implies the Limitation Thesis.
Even the most capacious or unlimited acts of consent, then, cannot give a
state the right that we obey the law if its requirements are unjust. Nor can
any state credibly claim to be authorized to commit an injustice because
it’s acting in our name. Obligations to obey the law that are established
in this manner come with justice-exceptions attached. In this sense, justice
precedes legitimacy.28
V.
The truth of the Limitation Thesis can be seen in various contexts.
Consider empowering agents to act on our behalf. Suppose I hire you to
manage my retirement account. By signing our contract, among other
things, I empower you to make investment decisions on my behalf. Being
granted that power, you gain some authority over my (ﬁnancial) life.
At the same time, it’s plain that your authority is limited by the act
through which I empowered you. Financial agents, like political authorities,
typically obtain such powers only as a result of their being transferred by
principals. Despite being empowered to manage my retirement account,
you may not decide how my other savings are allocated, say. Nor may you
allocate them in a manner that’s riskier than is allowed by the investment
proﬁle I selected. Nor, obviously, can you manage somebody else’s retirement savings in virtue of my consent. The ﬁrst two acts would be a breach
of contract. The third, a simple case of theft or fraud. Your authority is limited by the rights I transferred to you through my consent.
Of course, it’s usually understood (and contractually stated) that when I
empower you to arrange my ﬁnances, my act is clearly limited in these ways.
And political consent may be different. But this doesn’t seem a relevant
28. It might be said that obeying unjust laws need not involve committing or supporting
injustice. Perhaps if a law is created in an illegitimate manner, it might constitute an unjust
law—albeit unjust in a manner different (procedural, rather than substantive) from the
sense of unjust used in the text here. If such a law requires subjects to do things that are (substantively) morally permissible, the Limitation Principle is not violated. Perhaps our consent
does not bind us to obey such law either. I think it doesn’t. But the reasons for this would
be different from what’s expressed here.
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difference. Suppose that, when I hire you, we write into the contract that my
consent also empowers you to manage my neighbor’s account. This gives
you no more right to do so. Such consent misﬁres, and for the same reason—I can only empower you in this transaction to do things I have the
right to do myself. And I lack the right to manage my neighbor’s money.
Perhaps one might think the relation between me and my ﬁnancial manager isn’t one strictly of authority. While ﬁnancial managers might act on my
behalf (and make decisions in my name), they don’t quite issue commands.
But the Limitation Thesis remains plausible when we add this element.
Suppose my local ﬁre brigade is engaged in a range of activities. These
include, admirably, combatting wildﬁres, but also less admirable activities,
such as posting videos on social media in which they kick cats. Suppose
the group is up-front about this. If you join their group, you consent to follow orders, including the cat-kicking ones you might consider wrong.
Suppose now that I know about this, and voluntarily consent to join the
brigade. As we’re ﬁghting a ﬁre, I follow their orders, saving people and
their homes. Now the order comes down to kick a cat while others record
it. Surely, I am in no way morally obligated to kick the cat. And this is true
despite my consent. While my consent wasn’t void entirely—I remain obligated to obey the life-saving and home-saving orders—it’s limited by justice.
As the Limitation Thesis suggests, I cannot bind myself to kick the poor cat.
Certainly, there are further important differences between giving power
of attorney to ﬁnancial agents or joining a group of ﬁreﬁghters on the
one hand, and life as a citizen on the other. But the cases are the same
in all morally relevant respects. The persons or institutions in question
receive the right to tell one what to do, and they receive this as a result
of a transfer effected by one’s consent. Absent one’s consent, they would
lack this right, since their actions infringe upon what (absent consent or
something similar) is one’s rights-protected sphere of action. And the
moment of consent was the moment of waiving or transferring those rights,
thus empowering the authority in question. The extent of the power or
authority gained as a result of consent, therefore, is determined by the
extent of the rights that are transferred.
VI.
At this point, one might wonder whether this argument moves too quickly.
Even if we cannot bind ourselves to do things we don’t have a right to do, is
it really true that people always lack the right to commit injustice? Aren’t we
sometimes permitted to do things that would otherwise be unjust? Perhaps
we may commit a small injustice in order to avoid a very great injustice, for
example.
I agree that sometimes injustices might be justiﬁable all things considered. But that ﬁnal qualiﬁcation is crucial. Things that are pro tanto unjust
might be permissible all things considered. And those things, all things
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considered, one has the right to do. However, when things are all things
considered unjust, it remains true that one lacks, all things considered,
the right to do them.
This qualiﬁcation applies to the Limitation Thesis, too. The thesis holds
only that one cannot obligate oneself to obey in cases where, all things considered, one lacks the right to perform the required act in the ﬁrst place.
Suppose that some agent A has a pro tanto obligation to ∼R (where ∼R
means not violate someone’s rights). A thus lacks a pro tanto liberty-right
to R. However, if all things considered A does have the liberty-right to R,
the Limitation Thesis does not preclude A successfully consenting or promising to R (as long as R remains all things considered permissible). After all,
since it’s no longer true that, all things considered, A is obligated to ∼R, A
does have the requisite right to transfer.
This qualiﬁcation does not make the Limitation Thesis equivalent to the
Balancing Thesis. It’s true that, in cases where one has a consent-based obligation to obey, this obligation must be balanced against other moral
requirements. (This is the truth that gave the Balancing Thesis its plausibility.) But that does not mean one can obligate oneself to obey when one
lacks, all things considered, the right to do the legally required thing.
In those cases, there is no obligation to be outweighed. Our consent misﬁred.
VII.
While the Limitation Thesis is plausible in a variety of contexts, there are
also cases in which, at least initially, an objector might think the thesis
must be false. In particular, one might doubt the Limitation Thesis in contexts where the need for authority is very important. Consider, for example,
the military. While the authority of a soldier’s superiors may rest on the soldier’s consent to obey, the Limitation Thesis might seem false. Indeed, one
might think the thesis must be false in a context like the military. For the
military to work, soldiers cannot be allowed to second-guess the moral quality of their superiors’ decisions.
Something similar might be said about the obligation to obey the law.
Political authorities are needed precisely because people disagree about
questions of justice. And authorities cannot succeed at this unless citizens
are morally required to obey unjust laws. Absent that, it becomes difﬁcult
to see how states could help people cooperate and live together peacefully.
The workings of a state, then, might be thought to equally require that the
Limitation Thesis be false.
On this view, it’s a desideratum of a theory of legitimacy that the
Limitation Thesis does not apply to it. This leaves us with a choice. Either
the Limitation Thesis is false after all, or consent theory is a faulty theory
of legitimacy because the Limitation Thesis applies to it. Either way, the
arguments here don’t establish what they set out to demonstrate.
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Consider ﬁrst the case of military obedience. It’s clearly true that no military accepts soldiers making up their own mind about the validity of each
and every order. Nor, as a rule, do they accept perceived immorality as an
excuse for disobedience. Still, there are generally recognized exceptions to
the duty of obedience. Soldiers in the US military vow to obey all lawful
orders, in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But obedience to unlawful orders is punishable. The same is true in many other
countries.29
The standard for permissible disobedience, of course, typically refers to
an order’s illegality, not its immorality or injustice. But the two are related.
At least in extreme cases, the duty of obedience is often recognized as limited by morality. Canada’s Code of Conduct (2001) includes an exception if
“the order is manifestly unlawful,” where this is clariﬁed as follows: “A manifestly unlawful order is one which shocks the conscience of every reasonable, right-thinking person.” Germany’s Military Manual (1992) exempts
soldiers if an order “violates the human dignity of the third party concerned
or the recipient of the order.”
The exemption to obedience in US law is called the “Medina Standard,”
named after the captain who ordered the March 1968 My Lai massacre during the Vietnam war. The massacre was famously put to an end by Hugh
Thompson, a then twenty-ﬁve-year-old helicopter pilot. Thompson saw
the massacre, landed his helicopter between the villagers and the soldiers,
and ordered his crew to use their machine gun against the American troops
if they continued ﬁring on the villagers.30
Initial reactions to Thompson’s intervention matched the thrust of the
objection we’re considering here. After an attempted cover-up,
Thompson was widely criticized within the US military, as well as by the
government and the general public. But later reactions have been markedly
different. Thirty years after the massacre, Thompson and his crew received
the Soldier’s Medal, the United States Army’s highest award for bravery not
involving direct contact with the enemy. At the ceremony, Major General
Michael Ackerman praised Thompson and his men for doing the right
thing, having “set the standard for all soldiers to follow.”31
Still, one might think all this shows that soldiers are not obligated to obey
extremely unjust orders. And to be sure, that is all the jurisprudence supports.
So the thought that, for the military to work effectively, soldiers must be
required to obey (not extremely) unjust orders remains intuitive.

29. For an overview, see International Committee of the Red Cross, Practice Relating to Rule 154.
Obedience to Superior Orders, IHL DATABASE, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v2_rul_rule154 (last visited Aug. 27, 2021).
30. JONATHAN GLOVER, HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2001), at 62–63.
31. See Associated Press, My Lai Rescuer Hugh Thompson Jr., WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/06/AR2006010601911.
html?noredirect=on.
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However, this more moderate objection poses no conﬂict with the
Limitation Thesis. The key lies, again, in the distinction between pro
tanto and all things considered obligations discussed above. The objection
we are considering holds that the demands of military action create serious
moral pressure for soldiers to do things that are unjust. That is, actions that
are pro tanto impermissible might nevertheless be permissible all things
considered, given the military context. But if that’s the case, it’s no longer
true that soldiers lack the right, all things considered, to perform acts that
are pro tanto unjust (at least in the military context). As a result, the
Limitation Thesis doesn’t rule out that soldiers might empower military
authorities to, all things considered, bindingly command such acts.
It’s worth noting that this explanation is consistent with the phrasings of
the exemptions to obedience in many military documents. Typically, that
exemption is limited to laws and commands that are clearly or extremely
unjust or criminal. As the US Court of Military Appeals has ruled, “the justiﬁcation for acts done pursuant to orders does not exist if the order was of
such a nature that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know
it to be illegal.”32
In cases like these, it’s highly unlikely that soldiers have an all things considered right to perform the pro tanto unjust act. After all, when (even) the
law doesn’t allow a certain act to be commanded, it’s hard to think it may be
overall justiﬁable. The same is true when acts are clearly or extremely
wrong. Actions that violate human dignity or shock the conscience are
plainly beyond what we have, all things considered, the right to do.
By extension, the same can be said of political institutions. Even if it’s true
that just and stable societies are possible only if citizens obey unjust laws—
an assumption some might question—the Limitation Thesis does not rule
this out. As above, this objection assumes that there are times at which citizens might be all things considered obligated to do things that are pro
tanto unjust. But the Limitation Thesis doesn’t rule out successfully consenting to obey, all things considered, those kinds of laws. It precludes an
obligation to obey only when the need to cooperate and live together
does not outweigh a law’s injustice, all things considered. This, again, is
as it should be.33
32. United States v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108, 110 (1969). Keenan was found guilty of murder
after obeying an order to shoot an elderly Vietnamese citizen.
33. Does time make a difference? After all, the limits of consent seem, by this argument, to
be set at the time consent is given. And it may be possible that something that was at the time of
consent (t1) all things considered unjust becomes all things considered not unjust at the time
an order is issued (t2). In that case, the plausible idea that obedience may be obligated may
seem to contradict the Limitation Thesis. This objection is avoided, however, if one’s consent
includes certain conditional permissions. Thus, a soldier might consent at t1 to obey an order
at t2 that, at t1, is all things considered unjust, on the condition that it is no longer unjust at t2.
Such conditional authorizations are clearly possible, such as when we authorize ﬁnancial managers to buy stock up to a certain price. It’s not implausible that military or political consent
would generally be understood to contain such implied permissions.
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VIII.

The Limitation Thesis is true, then. Even subjects who give their most
unqualiﬁed consent will not have an obligation to obey the law if its requirements are all things considered unjust.
Consent, in other words, needs to be disaggregated. When we consent to
things, we never consent absolutely. We cannot consent absolutely. We can
only give our consent to those things that we have a right to do in the
ﬁrst place. And, of course, we only consent to the things to which we actually give our consent. Even the most unqualiﬁed consent given to the most
just institution thus binds citizens only to obey laws that do not require
things that are, all things considered, unjust.
Laws are unjust when they require things beyond the limits of the consent
received. And, likely, the consent people actually give is limited because
they only intend to legitimize whatever powers are needed for proper government. In that case, laws that go beyond those limits (such as laws aimed
at private enrichment) are unjust. Or perhaps there are rights one cannot
waive or transfer. In that case, certain laws would remain unjust even if subjects gave their most unqualiﬁed consent possible. And in any case one cannot successfully consent to laws that violate the rights of others.
Many things that would be unjust if done without consent can be just
when done with consent. Volenti non ﬁt iniuria. Thus, the practical upshot
of the argument here depends on the rights we have, our powers to transfer
those rights, and the actual consent we give. These are complicated questions, involving the nature or justice, autonomy, and more. The argument
here does not answer them. All it establishes is that, whatever the truth
about justice might be, the legitimate authority of institutions is limited
by it.
In the end, this view strikes me as attractive. Rawls famously said that
“justice is the ﬁrst virtue of social institutions.”34 The Limitation Thesis
lives up to this statement. After all, both the Exclusion and Balancing
Theses allow for unjust laws to carry the moral imprimatur of legitimate
authority. If an institution’s authority is circumscribed to rule out unjust
but authoritative directives, no such thing is possible. According to the
Limitation Thesis, justice does precede legitimacy.

34. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 3.
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